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v

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case was certified as final for purposes of appeal by the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County in a Minute Entry dated March 30, 2010. On May 5, 2010,
the Supreme Court of Utah transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102, U.C.A. § 78A-4-103, and
U.R.A.P. Rule 42(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The appeal in this matter arises from the district court's grant of Plaintiff/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant Centennial Bank (predecessor-in-interest to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and hereinafter the "Bank")'s cross-motion for summary
judgment, holding based upon Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice Recording
statutes that the Bank's deed of trust was a first position deed of trust having a priority
over the deed of trust of Defendant/Appellant Bradford E. Taylor. In granting the Bank
summary judgment, the district court held that even though the Bank's June 2, 2006 deed
of trust was invalid when recorded because it was executed by a borrower who did not
own the real property in question, under Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice
statutes, a valid conveyance was created by the Bank's trust deed with a priority date of
June 2, 2006, when the owner conveyed the property to the Bank's borrower through a
special warranty deed recorded on December 22, 2006.
The cross-appeal arises out of the court's denial of the Bank's cross-motion for
summary judgment for reformation of the December 22, 2006 special warranty deed.
The Bank requested an order of reformation decreeing the special warrant deed to be
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effective as of June 2, 2006, the date the Bank's deed of trust was recorded. In addition
to asserting mutual mistake and that the parties intended the Bank's deed of trust to be
effective as of June 2, 2006, the Bank argued that Taylor was not a bone fides purchaser
because he was on notice of the Bank's interest and knew and intended the Bank to be in
first position.
Issue For Review:

Did the trial court err in concluding that under Utah's After-

Acquired Title and Race-Notice statutes, that the Bank's deed of trust enjoyed a priority
over Defendant/Appellant Taylor's deed of trust?
Standard of Review: De novo. A district court's interpretation of a statute is
reviewed for correctness. O'Dea v. Olea 217 P.3d 704, 708 (Utah 2009).
Issue For Review:

Did the trial court err in denying the Bank summary

judgment on its claim of reformation?
Standard of Review:

De novo. Appellate courts review a summary judgment

determination for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal
conclusions. Appellate courts determine only whether the district court erred in applying
the governing law and whether the district court correctly held that there were no
disputed issues of material fact. Waymentv. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^
15, 116 P.3d 271, cited in Panos v. Olsen and Associates Const., Inc., 123 P.3d 816,
819 (Utah App. 2005).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case in which the relative priority of two deeds of trust is at issue. The
appeal comes before the court pursuant to a grant of a cross-motion for partial summary
judgment in favor of predecessor-in-interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"), Centennial Bank.1 (For simplicity, the FDIC and Centennial Bank shall be
referred to herein as the "Bank".)
Before the trial court, the Bank moved for summary judgment on the validity and
enforceability of its deed of trust based upon three legal theories: 1) equitable
subrogation, 2) reformation, and 3) Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice
Recording statutes. Appellant Bradford Taylor (hereinafter "Taylor55) moved for partial
summary judgment on equitable subrogation and argued that as a matter of law, the Bank
was not entitled to priority over his deed of trust based upon reformation, After-Acquired
Title, or Race-Notice.
The trial court heard argument and took the matter under advisement. In a
Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 2009, the court denied both parties summary
judgment on equitable subrogation, and denied the Bank relief on its reformation claim.
R. 1139-1149.2 In the Memorandum Decision, the court requested additional briefing on
the After-Acquired Title/Race- Notice issues. R. 1148. Ultimately, the court granted the
1

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was substituted as the real party in interest
pursuant to this Court's order dated July 27, 2010.
2

Pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b), the Bank filed a motion to reconsider the court's
denial of reformation on November 9, 2009. That motion was mooted by the Court's
December 3, 2009 Memorandum Decision in which the court rendered its "final"
decision on the cross-motions. R. 1234.
Page 3 of 38

Bank summary judgment and priority over Taylor's deed of trust based upon the AfterAcquired Title and Race-Notice statutes in a Memorandum Decision dated December 3,
2009. R. 1232-1236. Copies of both Memorandum Decisions are included in the
Addendum to Taylor's Brief.
In the October 6, 2009 Memorandum Decision, the trial court held that the failure
to execute a document did not amount to a scrivener's error, that reformation was
inapplicable under the facts of this case, and denied the Bank's cross-motion for
summary judgment. In the December 3,2009 Memorandum Decision, the trial court
granted the Bank's cross-motion for summary judgment relying upon the After-Acquired
Title statute in concluding that even though the Bank's deed of trust was invalid when
recorded on June 2,2006, as a consequence of the December 22, 2006 special warranty
deed and the After-Acquired Title statute, title to the property immediately passed to the
Bank "as i f title had been in the borrower on June 2, 2006, the date the Bank's deed of
trust was recorded. The court also held that Taylor was on notice of the Bank's interest at
the time he took his deed of trust in September 2006.
The order granting the Bank summary judgment was certified as final for purposes
of appeal under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on March 30, 2010. R.
1338-1342. These appeals followed. Taylor has appealed the trial court's AfterAcquired Title/Race-Notice ruling. R. 1374. The Bank has cross-appealed the trial
court's denial of the Bank's reformation claim. R. 1382.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The majority of the facts below are a summary taken from the Bank's statement of
undisputed facts before the trial court, which consisted of 168 separate paragraphs which
the trial court found were undisputed. Additional facts are taken from Appellant Taylor's
statement of undisputed facts. Copies of the Bank's memoranda in support of its crossmotion for summary judgment, Taylor's memoranda in support of his cross-motion for
summary judgment, as well as the parties' supplemental memoranda on the AfterAcquired Title and Race-Notice issues are included in the Bank's Addendum to this brief.
1.

The events giving rise to this action occurred between April and December

2006. R. 870-893.
2.

In April 2006, Defendant Gary McDonald ("McDonald") approached a

mortgage broker and asked him to "shop around" an application for a loan (the "Loan")
for the acquisition and development of real property located in Riverton, Utah (the
"Property"). R. 870-872.
3.

The purpose of the Loan was to pay for the purchase of the Property,

including the satisfaction of all existing liens and encumbrances and to pay for the
development of a sixteen-lot subdivision on the Property. R. 870 -873.
4.

Both McDonald and the mortgage broker understood and agreed that

McDonald would have ultimate control and would make all final decisions concerning
the Loan. R. 872.
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5.

At this time, title to the Property was vested in McDonald's corporation,

G&L Mac, Inc., and was encumbered by two deeds of trust, one in favor of Millennia
Investment Corporation and another in favor of Cottonwood Assets. R. 463, 464.
6.

The mortgage broker knew based upon his professional experience that the

Bank would not make an acquisition and development loan ("A&D Loan") unless the
loan was secured by a first position deed of trust and the loan was made to the borrower
individually. R. 873.
1.

When the mortgage broker had secured all the necessary information, he

submitted the loan package to a loan officer at the Bank. R. 873-875.
8.

The Bank's loan officer also knew that the Bank would not make an A&D

Loan unless the loan was secured by a first position deed of trust and the loan was made
to the borrower individually. R. 875.
9.

At each stage of the loan application/evaluation process, up to and

including approval by the Bank's loan committee, the basic terms of the loan for which
McDonald applied, and the loan which the Bank agreed to make, were as follows: a) Mr.
McDonald needed to borrow enough money to finish paying for the Property and to pay
off all prior and existing liens upon the Property, b) the Loan was to be a personal loan,
secured by a first position deed of trust on the Property that was to be owned by Mr.
McDonald personally, and c) the Loan proceeds would be used to acquire the Property,
clear title to the Property of all liens and encumbrances, and pay for subdivision
improvements on the Property. R. 873-874, 876, 880.
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10.

Ultimately, the Loan was approved by the Bank and was sent to the Bank

employee who was responsible for funding of the Loan. R. 879-880.
11.

The Bank' employee prepared the appropriate loan documents and sent

them to a title company for the closing. R. 880-884.
12.

While the Bank's employee prepared the loan documentation such as the

promissory note, the truth in lending disclosures, and the deed of trust, she did not
prepare the necessary deeds or other title documents required for vesting title to the
Property in McDonald individually because it was the title company's responsibility to
make sure that the appropriate documents were executed at closing and recorded so that
title to the Property was vested in Gary McDonald individually, free and clear of the
Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets deeds of trust. R. 885.
13.

The loan package was sent to the title company on or about May 25, 2006.

R. 884.
14.

The escrow officer at the title company understood that the Loan was to

McDonald in his individual capacity and not to G&L Mac, Inc., McDonald's corporation,
and that the Bank was to have a first position deed of trust on the Property. R. 884, 886.
15.

The escrow officer obtained the payoff amounts from Millennia Investment

Corporation and Cottonwood Assets on or about June 1, 2006. R. 888.
16.

In returning a "First Lien Letter" to the Bank, it was the escrow officer's

intent, and she represented to the Bank, that the Bank's deed of trust was, and would take,
a first position upon the Property. R. 888.

Page 7 of38

17.

However, the escrow officer made a mistake in the closing. She did not

have McDonald execute a deed as President of G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald
individually, as required by the terms of the agreement between McDonald and the Bank.
Nor did she have such a deed recorded in the official records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder. R. 888.
18.

It was her mistake alone, and not the mistake of McDonald or the Bank. R.

19.

Neither the Bank nor McDonald were aware or had any knowledge of her

888.

mistake. R. 888.
20.

After the loan package was returned from the title company to the Bank, the

Bank employee in charge of funding the Loan reviewed the loan package to ensure that
the Bank was to have a first position deed of trust on the Property and funded the Loan.
R. 889-891.
21.

Because the lender's policy of title insurance was going to be delivered to

the Bank after funding, the employee examined both the First Lien Letter and the title
insurance commitment to confirm that the Bank's deed of trust was in first position. R.
890.
22.

She had no knowledge that the Bank's deed of trust would not take first

position upon the Property. R. 891.
23.

If she had known or had been told that the Bank's deed of trust would not

be a first position deed of trust upon the Property, she would not have authorized the
funding of the Loan. R. 891.
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24.

After she determined that all pre-funding requirements had been satisfied,

she authorized the funding of the Loan and the loan proceeds were wired to the title
company for disbursement. R. 891.
25.

On June 2, 2006, the title company received the wire transfer from

Centennial Bank's Ogden, Utah office in the amount of $864,452.23. R. 891.
26.

Also on June 2, 2006, the title company received another wire transfer from

Centennial Bank's Ogden, Utah office in the amount of $226,175.17. R. 891.
27.

Consistent with the Closing Statement, the wire transfers were used to pay

off Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets. R. 891.
28.

The escrow officer requested deeds of reconveyance for the Millennia

Investment and Cottonwood Assets deeds of trust, so that they could be recorded and the
Bank's deed of trust would enjoy a first position upon the Property. R. 891.
29.

She also caused the Bank's deed of trust to be recorded in the office of the

Salt Lake County Recorder. R. 891.
30.

This occurred on June 2, 2006. R. 891.

31.

While the Bank's deed of trust was executed by McDonald in his individual

capacity, at the time of the execution and recording of the deed of trust, G&L Mac, Inc.
was the owner of record title to the Property. R. 888, 893.
32.

At about this same time, in April or May of 2006, Defendant McDonald

was negotiating for a loan from Taylor. R. 911-912.
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33.

As part of his arrangement with McDonald, Taylor as obligee, read,

approved, and executed a Note Secured By Deed Of Trust, dated June 1, 2006. R. 712, ^
9.
34.

In relevant part, the note states as follows:
PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE ANY (sic) LOTS SHALL BE
DISBURSED FIRST TO CENTENNIAL BANK ANY AND ALL
REMAINING FUNDS SHALL BE DISBURSED TO BRAD E. TAYLOR.

R. 719. See Tab 1, Taylor's Addendum.
35.

Pursuant to these negotiations and to secure the obligations under this note,

on June 1,2006, McDonald executed a deed of trust in favor of Taylor in the amount of
$335,000. R. 912.
36.

This deed of trust was recorded in the official records of the Salt Lake

County Recorder on June 5,2006, three days after the Bank's deed of trust was recorded.
R. 912.
37.

Taylor's June 5, 2006 deed of trust suffered from the same defect as the

Bank's June 2, 2006 deed of trust; both were executed by Gary McDonald individually at
a time when record title to the Property was held by G&L Mac, Inc. R. 721.
38.

Sometime around September 2006, at a time when Taylor was considering

lending more money to McDonald, Taylor discovered that his June 5,2006 deed of trust
had been executed by McDonald individually rather than G&L Mac, Inc. R. 714-715,
914-915.
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39.

In an effort to resolve this problem and to evidence the additional funds he

was lending McDonald, Taylor as obligee, read, approved, and executed another Note
Secured By Deed Of Trust on September 5, 2006. R. 714-715.
40.

In material part, this note states as follows:
PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF ANY OF THE LOTS IN THE
MCKENZIE PARK ESTATES SUBDIVISION SHALL BE DISBURSED
FIRST TO CENTENNIAL BANK, THEN ANY AND ALL REMAINING
FUNDS SHALL BE PAYABLE TO BRADFORD E. TAYLOR.

R. 734; see Tab 7, Bank's Addendum.
41.

To secure the obligations under this note, on September 5, 2006, Taylor

obtained another deed of trust, this one executed by G&L Mac, Inc. describing the
Property, which was recorded in the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder on
September 6,2006, three months after the Bank's deed of trust was recorded. R. 915.
42.

Later, in December 2006, the title company's escrow officer discovered her

mistake in not having Gary McDonald as President of G&L Mac, Inc., execute a deed
from G&L Mac, Inc. to Gary McDonald individually, and in not recording such a deed.
R. 892.
43.

Upon discovering this mistake, she immediately contacted Mr. McDonald

and a title company in Salt Lake City and arranged to have McDonald sign a special
warranty deed and to have the deed recorded. R. 892.
44.

This special warranty deed was recorded on December 22, 2006, in the

official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. R. 892.
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45.

The Bank's June 2, 2006 deed of trust was properly entered in the Salt Lake

County Recorder's entry record, and was properly indexed in the grantors', grantees',
mortgagors' and mortgagees' indices. R. 892.
46.

At any time after the recordation of the Bank's deed of trust on June 2,

2006, a reasonable title examination would have discovered the Bank's deed of trust. R.
892.
47.

If after June 2, 2006, any person had contacted the Bank and had inquired

about the Bank's loan to McDonald, the Bank would have informed that person of the
Bank's interest in the Property. R. 892.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In granting the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court

correctly applied Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice Recording statutes,
holding that the Bank's deed of trust was a valid first position deed of trust upon the
Property with a priority date of June 2,2006. 3
2.

In denying the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court

erred in not applying the equitable doctrine of reformation to the December 22, 2006
special warranty deed, and holding that as reformed, the special warranty deed in
conjunction with the Bank's deed of trust, resulted in the Bank's deed of trust having a
priority date of June 2, 2006.

3

The Bank's deed of trust was executed on June 1, 2006 and recorded June 2, 2006.
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ARGUMENT
POJJVTJ
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
AND RACE-NOTICE STATUTES TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
A.
Under U.C.A. § 57-1-10, The Bank Enjoys A Priority Over Taylor's
Deed of Trust.
In this case, McDonald executed the Bank's deed of trust in his individual capacity
at a time when record title to the Property was in the name of G&L Mac, Inc.,
McDonald's Utah for-profit corporation. R. 888. This was solely and exclusively the
result of an error in the closing in which the escrow officer failed to have McDonald
execute a dood from McDonald as president of G&L Mac, Inc. to McDonald individually,
so as to vest title to the Property in McDonald individually, as required by the agreement
between McDonald and the Bank. R. 888, f 131,132; 872, f 22; 873, f 29; 874, f 33;
876, % 44; 880, ^ 77. Subsequently, after discovering her error, the escrow officer had
McDonald, as President of G&L Mac, Inc., execute a special warranty deed to McDonald
individually, which was recorded on December 22, 2006. R. 892.
At the time, Utah's After-Acquired Title statute read as follows:
(1) If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting
to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and at the time of the
conveyance the person does not have the legal estate in the real estate, but
afterwards acquires the same:
(a) the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately
pass to the grantee, the grantee's heirs, successors, or assigns;
and
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(b) the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had
been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.
(2)(a) Subsection (1) applies to a conveyance by:
(i) warranty deed;
(ii) special warranty deed; or
(iii) trust deed.
U.C.A. § 57-1-10 (2006).
The statute applies to both the deed of trust and special warranty deed in this case.
When McDonald as trustor executed the Bank's deed of trust at a time when he did not
own title, he "purported" to convey the Property to the trustee of the deed of trust. When
McDonald, as President of G&L Mac, Inc., subsequently executed the special warranty
deed, the legal estate subsequently acquired by McDonald individually, immediately
passed to the Bank. U.C.A. § 57-l-10(l)(a). As a consequence, the combined effect of
the deed of trust and the special warranty deed was to vest title to the Property in the
Bank's trustee "as i f McDonald had been vested with title to the Property on June 2,
2006, the time when he executed the Bank's deed of trust. The result is that "the [June 2,
2006] conveyance [to the Bank] is as valid as if the legal estate had been in [McDonald]
at the time of [the Bank's deed of trust]." U.C.A. § 57-l-10(l)(b) (2006).
The relief granted by the trial court is consistent with the authorities which have
addressed the circumstances of this case, where intervening interests come into play with
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the After-Acquired Title doctrine.4 As stated in American Law of Property, Little Brown
and Company, A. James Casmr, Editor in Chief, § 15.22 p. 849 n.3 (1952):
[Tjhere is a clash between the equally beneficent doctrines of estoppel [by
deed] and of [constructive] notice. The only way to avoid it is by a judicial
construction that the record of the earlier deed, prior to the execution and
delivery of the later deed, is nevertheless record notice to the second
purchaser in spite of the fact that at date of the record the deed was a nullity
in whole or in part for lack of title in the grantor.
As a consequence, the trial court correctly ruled that when the special warranty
deed was executed and recorded, title to the Property vested in McDonald, individually,
"as i f the legal estate had been in McDonald at the time he executed the Bank's deed of
trust. R. 1233-1236. Therefore, the deed of trust is valid and enforceable "as o f June 2,
2006.
B.
The Bank Enjoys A Priority Over Taylor's Deed of Trust Pursuant To
U.C.A. § 57-1-20.
The Bank notes that the trial court's ruling was also correct under U.C.A. §57-120, which provides in part:
All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the
trustor, or the trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of
the deed of trust, shall inure to the trustee as security for the obligation or
obligations for which the trust property is conveyed as if acquired before
the execution of the trust deed.
While this statute is specific to trust deeds, it fits "hand-in-glove" with the AfterAcquired Title statute discussed above, and the Race-Notice statute discussed below.

4

The After-Acquired Title doctrine is also referred to as estoppel by deed. Love v.
Arnold Industries, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002) ("The [After-Acquired Title] statute has
codified in part the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed, sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of after-acquired title.5').
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The language is clear and unambiguous. When applied to the facts of this case it makes
clear that all right, title, interest, and claim of McDonald acquired under the special
warranty deed inured to the trustee as security for the loan the Bank made to McDonald
as if McDonald's interest had been acquired before the execution of the trust deed. Here
the relation back nature of the statute is made clear. This is because as in U.C.A. § 57-110, the right, title, interest and claim inure to the benefit of the trustee "as i f they had
been acquired before the execution of the deed of trust.
C.

Conclusion.

Under both U.C.A. §§ 57-1-10 and 57-1-20, when G&L Mac, Inc. executed the
special warranty deed in favor of McDonald individually, the interest conveyed to
McDonald "immediately passed" and "inured" in the trustee "as i f it had been acquired
by McDonald before the trust deed was executed. It is noteworthy and instructive that
these two statutes contemplate the precise circumstances of this case. It is also
instructive that both statutes provide the identical remedy. Hence, by their very
existence, they recognize that from time to time errors occur in the recordation of deeds
and the conveyancing of property. Stated otherwise, the statutes were enacted and
intended to address cases such as this. Consistent with the clear mandate of these
statutes, the trial court correctly concluded that upon the recordation of the special
warranty deed, title to the property immediately passed to, and inured in, the Bank as if
McDonald had been in title at the time the Bank's deed of trust was recorded.
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POINT II
TAYLOR'S NEWLY ASSERTED ARGUMENT IGNORES THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES. UNDER THE RACE-NOTICE RECORDING
ACT, TAYLOR IS ON CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE BANK'S LIEN AND
UNDER THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE, TITLE PASSES TO THE
BANK "AS IF" MCDONALD HAD BEEN VESTED WITH TITLE AT THE TIME
OF THE JUNE 2,2006 DEED OF TRUST.
Taylor argues that the Utah's After-Acquired Title statute "only passes the interest
subsequently acquired." Taylor's Brief, Page 10. That is, the interest the Bank received
under the special warranty deed is subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 deed of trust,
because that deed of trust was recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's office prior to
the December 22, 2006 special warranty deed. Taylor's Brief, Pages 11-12. Hence,
Taylor asserts that the interest "subsequently acquired" by the Bank through the special
warranty deed is subject or subordinate to Taylor's September 6, 2006 deed of trust. This
is essentially a constructive notice argument under Utah's Race-Notice statute. Taylor's
argument has two fundamental flaws.
A.

The Race-Notice Recording Act.

First, Taylor argues the Bank's interest is subordinate to his deed of trust by
reason of constructive notice. However, he is asking this Court to apply the Race-Notice
statute inconsistently. Taylor argues that the Bank is subordinate because it was on
constructive notice of the September 6,2006 deed of trust when the Bank took the
December 22, 2006 special warranty deed. Yet, Taylor asks this Court to disregard the
fact that he was on constructive notice of the Bank's June 2, 2006 deed of trust, which
was of record when Taylor took his deed of trust on September 6, 2006.
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The Bank acknowledges that there is a factual distinction between the two deeds
of trust: the Bank's deed of trust was executed by McDonald; Taylor's deed of trust was
executed by G&L Mac, Inc., both at a time when record title was in G&L Mac, Inc. For
constructive notice purposes however, it makes no difference that the Bank's deed of
trust was executed by McDonald individually. Even though the Bank's deed of trust was
executed by McDonald individually, Taylor is still on notice of its contents.
This is because under the Race-Notice statute, notice of the contents of the deed of
trust was imparted to all persons from the time of recording. U.C.A. § 57-3-102(1). See
Point IV. A., below. And, in addition to being on constructive notice of the Bank's deed
of trust, Taylor was also on inquiry notice of all facts which a reasonable inquiry would
reveal about the Bank's interest in the Property. O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,f40, 217
P.3d 704. ("It is well established that whatever is notice enough to excite attention and
put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led. In other words, when a person has sufficient information to lead
him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."). The undisputed facts establish that
if Taylor had contacted the Bank and inquired about the deed of trust, he would have
been advised that the Bank claimed a deed of trust upon the Property. R. 892, ^f 164.5

Also, it is undisputed that Taylor was on actual notice of the Bank's interest in the
Property because in both of his promissory notes he acknowledged the Bank's interest
and "read" and "approved" the notes which provided that the Bank would receive the first
proceeds from the sale of all lots in the subdivision. R.712, 714, 715, 719, 734; 893, ^
167. See Tab 1 in Taylor's Addendum and Tab 7 of the Bank's Addendum.
Page 18 of 38

So, Taylor's constructive notice analysis fails because it is inconsistent. His
argument is essentially that this Court should afford him the benefit of the Race-Notice
statute in granting him priority over the Bank's deed of trust because his deed of trust was
recorded before the special warranty deed, but that the Court should deny the same
benefits of the same statute to the Bank, even though the Bank's deed of trust was
recorded at the Salt Lake County Recorder's office before Taylor took his September 6,
2006 deed of trust.
This Court should not apply the statute inconsistently.
B.

The After-Acquired Title Statute.

The second problem with Taylor's argument is that it fails under an AfterAcquired Title analysis. Specifically, Taylor's argument relies upon subsection 57-1 10(l)(a) in arguing that the Bank's interest is subject to Taylor's deed of trust but ignores
subsection 57-l-10(l)(b) of the very same statute. Indeed, the only way in which
Taylor's argument makes sense is if the Court completely disregards the plain language
of subsection 57-l-10(l)(b), which states as follows:
(b) the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had been in the
grantor at the time of the conveyance.
U.C.A. § 57-1-10 (2006). This language makes clear that the "conveyance" (the Bank's
June 2,2006 deed of trust) is as valid "as if the legal estate had been in [McDonald] at the
time of the [Bank's deed of trust]." This means that the Bank's deed of trust is as valid as
if McDonald had been the owner of record title to the Property on the date he signed the
deed of trust and the date the Bank's deed of trust was recorded.
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Taylor's argument can only make sense if the Court disregards the clear directive
of subsection 57-1-10(1 )(b). But under well-established rules of statutory construction,
courts look to the entire statute when interpreting the same. Andrus v. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 2010 UT App. 265, \ 11,241 P.3d 385. (Interpretation of the statutory
language requires consideration of the statute as a whole and its provisions are interpreted
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the
same and related chapters.).
The Court should not disregard the clear language of subsection U.C.A. § 57-110(l)(b).
POINT III
TAYLOR'S HYPOTHETICAL IS NOT PERSUASIVE FOR FOUR REASONS: 1)
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE IS INTENDED TO BE
RETROACTIVE IN ITS APPLICATION, 2) UTAH IS NOT A CHAIN OF TITLE
JURISDICTION, 3) UNDER THE AFTER-ACQUIRED STATUTE, THE
INTEREST SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRED PASSES TO THE GRANTEE, AND
4) TAYLOR'S HYPOTHETICAL IS BASED UPON FACTUAL INACCURACIES
AND IGNORES MATERIAL PROVISIONS OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
STATUTE.
At Pages 15-16 of his brief, Taylor offers the Court an unpersuasive hypothetical.
At its core, Taylor's hypothetical argues that the Bank receives a greater interest through
the application of the After-Acquired Title statute than it received through the special
warranty deed. According to Taylor, this is because under the statute, the Bank's interest
in the Property is not encumbered by the September 6, 2006 deed of trust. Taylor argues
because the Property was encumbered by Taylor's deed of trust at the time of the special
warranty deed, the retroactive nature of the After-Acquired Title statute gives the Bank a
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greater interest than the bank took through the special warranty deed. While Taylor's
argument accurately comprehends the retroactive operation of the statute, his argument is
not persuasive.
A.
The After-Acquired Title Statute is Intended To Be Retroactive In Its
Application.
First and foremost, Taylor's criticism is not valid because the After-Acquired Title
statute was designed to operate retroactively. That is, the central feature of the statute
provides that the subsequent deed relates back to the initial "purported" grant. This is
clear from a reading of the statute. And, there is nothing unusual about the relation-back
characteristic of the statute. The relation-back doctrine is a familiar legal theory in Utah
real property law. For example, a relation-back doctrine is a basic aspect of Utah's
mechanic's lien law. U.C.A. § 38r 1-5 ("The liens herein provided for shall relate back to,
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials ..").
Moreover, Taylor offers no explanation why the clear language of the AfterAcquired Title statute, which provides that "the conveyance shall be as valid as if the
legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance", was not intended to
operate exactly as provided in the statute, in a retroactive manner. Indeed, the very title
of the statute "After-Acquired Title Passes" clearly contemplates its relation-back
character. Taylor offers no convincing rationale why this interpretation is not
appropriate.
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B.
Taylor's Hypothetical Employs A Chain of Title Analysis, Similar to
That in Premier Bank v. Bent County Comm'rs, 214 P.3d 574 (Colo. App. 2009).
Next, Taylor's hypothetical is based upon a chain of title analysis in which only
documents in the chain of title impart constructive notice and ignores Utah's Race-Notice
Recording Act and tract index system. Accordingly, Taylor's analysis is basically the
same as found in Premier Bank v. Bent County Comm 'rs9 214 P.3d 574 (Colo. App.
2009), which the trial court properly declined to follow. R. 1233-1236.6
In chain of title jurisdictions, an instrument recorded outside of the chain of title is
treated as though it was never recorded at all. See, Collins v. Scott, 943 P.2d 20, 23
(Colo. App. 1996); 12 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition (David A. Thomas
ed., 1994), § 92.07(d) pp. 103-04. This is because in chain of title jurisdictions, the
principal mechanisms for conducting title searches are the grantor-grantee indices. These
indices index documents based upon the grantor and grantee of each recorded document.
They do not index a document to a particular parcel of property or tract of land, as does
Utah's tract index. So, when examining records of title, an examiner in a chain of title
jurisdiction looks for documents executed by persons or entities that appear in the
relevant chain of title. They do not look for documents executed by persons or entities
outside the chain of title.
Referring to Taylor's hypothetical, in a chain of title jurisdiction when D (the
subsequent grantee) took his interest, he had no way of knowing of the conveyance Z (the

For a detailed analysis of the distinction between Colorado's chain of title and Utah's
Recording Act, see the Bank's Supplemental Memorandum at R. 1210-1225, found at
Tab 5 of the Bank's Addendum.
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non-owner) had given B (the initial grantee) because under a chain of title system, the
instrument from Z to B would fall outside the chain of title. A title searcher would only
discover interests created by C (the owner) or C's predecessors-in-interest. Therefore, at
the time D's interest was created, D was not on constructive notice of the Z to B
instrument. In a chain of title jurisdiction, to subject D's interest to B's lien would turn a
race-notice regime such as that in Colorado on its head, as the Premier Bank court
correctly noted.
C.

Utah Is Not a Chain of Title Jurisdiction.

Taylor's hypothetical is not persuasive for at least two reasons. First, Utah is not a
chain of title jurisdiction. In Utah, county recorders maintain not only grantor-grantee
indices but also are required by statute to maintain tract indices. Second, Taylor's
argument ignores this important distinction and effectively asks this Court to write the
tract index statutes out of existence.
In Utah, each county recorder's tract index indexes each document to the
particular tract of land or parcel of property described in the document. See Utah Code
Ann. § 17-21-6(l)(f) and § 17-21-6(3)(a) (2009). If Taylor's hypothetical occurred in
Utah, D (the subsequent grantee) would be on constructive notice of the Z to B
instrument. This is because a reasonable title search would involve searching the tract
index. In a tract index, which as noted indexes all documents that pertain to a particular
tract or parcel, one would quickly find all instruments purporting to create an interest in
the property. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6-(l)(f) and §17-21-6(3). That would include
the Z to B instrument. In Utah, therefore, giving the Z to B instrument priority over the C
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to D instrument would not turn race-notice on its head. Indeed, it is entirely consistent
with race-notice because any reasonable title search would quickly find the Z to B
instrument in the tract index, and under the statute all persons would be on notice of the
document's contents. U.C.A. § 57-3-102(1).7
Therefore, like Premier Bank, Taylor's hypothetical is not helpful on the question
pending before this Court. This is because the Premier Bank holding and Taylor's
hypothetical are based on notice within a chain of title doctrine. Utah law regarding
notice in this context is materially different than Colorado's, for example. Holding that
the June 2,2006 deed of trust in favor of the Bank is superior to the September 6, 2006
trust deed in favor of Taylor does not offend Utah's Race-Notice law. This is because
while a title search conducted in the grantor-grantee indices in September of 2006 may
not have disclosed the June 2, 2006 deed of trust, a reasonable search conducted in the
tract index would certainly have disclosed it. R. 625-626. This is sufficient to put the
world on notice of the contents of the June 2, 2006 deed of trust. See Utah Code Ann. §
57-3-102(1) (2009). Taylor was therefore on constructive notice of the Bank's June 2006
deed of trust when G&L Mac, Inc. delivered his trust deed to him in September of that
same year.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is undisputed that Taylor had actual knowledge of
Bank's interest in the subject property when he accepted his deed of trust. R. 734.

7

As noted earlier, Taylor was on constructive notice from the time of "recording" of the
June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust. See Point IV. A. below.
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In short, giving priority to the June 2006 deed of trust squares perfectly with
principles of race-notice in Utah.
D.
Taylor's Hypothetical Is Based Upon Factual Inaccuracies and Ignores
Material Provisions of The After-Acquired Title Statute.
Finally, there is no merit to Taylor's hypothetical that the Bank obtains a greater
interest under the After-Acquired statute than was intended to be conveyed. See Taylor's
Brief, Point II, Page 15. First, the hypothetical is based upon legal and factual
inaccuracies. For example, the hypothetical assumes that Taylor's September 2006 deed
of trust has priority over the Bank's deed of trust. Second, the hypothetical ignores
subsection U.C.A. § 57-l-10(l)(b). As a consequence, the hypothetical is not persuasive
and fails.
POINT IV
TAYLOR IS NOT A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT
NOTICE WHO RECORDED FIRST.
A.
Under Utah's Race-Notice Recording Act, Notice Is Imparted Upon
Recordation.
It is clear from Taylor's Brief, beginning at Page 16, that he asserts that he did not
have notice of the Bank's deed of trust at the time of his September 6, 2006 deed of trust.
He asserts that because the Bank's deed of trust was "invalid", he was not on constructive
notice. Taylor's Brief, Pages 16-18.
However, this argument ignores the import of U.C.A. § 57-3-102(1). In relevant
part, with italics added, this statute provides as follows:
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Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title . .. shall from the time of recording with the
appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of [its] contents.
It is clear from the statute, that notice is imparted from the time of recording. See, Arnold
Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133,fflf28, 29, 63 P.3d 721. 8 The undisputed facts establish
that the Bank's deed of trust was recorded on June 2,2006. R. 513; 891, \ 157. Under
the statutory language, it is clear that notice is imparted upon recordation. Because notice
of the contents of the Bank's deed of trust was imparted to Taylor on June 2, 2006, he
was on constructive notice of its contents, even though it was executed by McDonald at a
time when G&L Mac, Inc. owned record title. His assertion that he is a bona fide
purchaser without notice therefore fails.
B.

The Cases Relied Upon By Taylor Do Not Support His Position.

Further, none of the cases relied upon by Taylor at Page 18 of his brief involve a
claim of after-acquired title. The cases cited only involve each jurisdiction's
recording/constructive notice statutes. Tellingly, Taylor does not explain how the afteracquired title/race-notice statutory schemes of those jurisdictions compare to Utah's. So,
even if the facts of those cases were similar to the facts of this case, which they are not,
Taylor has not shown how the recording acts or the after-acquired title laws of those
jurisdictions support his arguments.

But see In re Hiseman, 330 B.R. 251(Bky. Utah 2005)(Chapter 7 trustee lacked
constructive notice because deed of trust was incorrectly indexed in tract index even
though properly indexed in grantee-grantor index).
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Additionally, Taylor did not present this argument to the trial court. Taylor
argues that the Bank's deed of trust is invalid because it was a forgery or was
fraudulently obtained. Taylor's Brief, Page 18. This is not a forgery case, however.
Forgery is defined as follows:
The false making or material alteration of a document with the intent to
defraud. A signature of a person that is made without the persons' consent
and without the person otherwise authorizing it.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, 1990, p. 650. There is no evidence that
McDonald's signature is not his own. Indeed, it is undisputed that McDonald did in fact
execute the Bank's deed of trust. R. 887, ^ 127. The undisputed facts also establish that
he executed the December 22,2006 special warranty deed. R. 614-615; 892, f 160.
McDonald's signature on both documents is clearly his own. Accordingly, Taylor's
reliance upon Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P. 2d 50 (Utah 1978); Lloyd v. Chicago Title
Insurance Company, 576 So. 2d 310 (Fla. App. 1990); mdMosley v. Magnolia
Petroleum Company, 114 P.2d 740 (N.M. 1941) is misplaced.
Neither is this a case in which Ohio law, which appears to be a minority position,
controls. In MERS v. Odita, 822 N.E. 2d 821 (Ohio App. 2004), the mortgage was
defectively executed because the mortgagor's signature was not properly notarized. It is
noteworthy that even in the context of Ohio law, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated:

9

Taylor's assertion that the defect in the Bank's deed of trust is akin to a forgery amounts
to a new claim or defense not presented to the trial court. As such, the Court should
decline to hear argument on this newly asserted claim or defense. Further, the undisputed
facts do not establish that the defect in the Bank's deed of trust was the result of a forgery
or the unauthorized alteration of a document. Hence, there are no facts in this record to
support such a claim or defense.
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It would seem that, as a matter of principle, a defectively executed
mortgage should be superior to a subsequent legal interest if the subsequent
legal interest was acquired with notice of the prior defectively executed
mortgage. See 69 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust,
section 103[ ]. However, "[w]hile this is the rule in many jurisdictions, the
rule is otherwise in Ohio because of the recording statutes."
Jnln re MacArthur, 430 B.R. 300 (Bky. N.D. Georgia 2010), a bankruptcy trustee
also asserted that a security deed was defective and not in a recordable form because the
trust deed's trustor's signature was not properly notarized, which rendered the entire deed
incapable of being recorded and prevented the deed from providing constructive notice of
any transfer. 430 B.R. at 304. In rejecting this assertion, the court stated:
The Court agrees with the Defendant and concludes that, under Georgia
law, the existence of the unattested signature of Mrs. MacArthur does not
prevent the security deed from being recorded as to the transfer of the
Debtor's interest in the properties. Accordingly, the security deed provided
constructive notice of the Defendant's interest in the properties. For this
reason, the Trustee's complaint should be dismissed . . . .
The cases cited by Taylor do not support his position.
POINT V
TAYLOR'S RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION ARGUMENT IS NOT
PERSUASIVE.
Lastly, Taylor unpersuasively argues that the application of the After-Acquired
Title statute to the Bank's special warranty deed and deed of trust operates as an unlawful
restraint on alienation. Taylor's Brief, Page 19. Taylor provides no Utah cases to
support his position and the Bank does not believe any exist. Neither has Taylor
provided a reasoned analysis why this doctrine applies to the After-Acquired Title and
Race-Notice Recording statutes.
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An adequately briefed argument contains the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. Implicitly, Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules App. Pro.,
requires not just bald citation to authority but the development of that authority and a
reasoned analysis based on that authority. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 13, 99 P.3d 820
and State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). A reviewing court is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, "[a court] may refuse, sua
sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^f 22, 128 P.3d
1179 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(j)).
The Bank respectfully submits that Taylor has not provided a reasoned analysis in
support of its argument. The Court should therefore decline to address this issue.
POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE BANK'S CLAIM OF
REFORMATION.
A.

Introduction.

The Bank moved for reformation of the December 22, 2006 special warranty deed
seeking an order decreeing that the special warranty deed is effective as of June 2, 2006.
R 387, 870, 897. In support of its position, the Bank asserted that the failure of the
escrow officer to obtain and record a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. to McDonald
individually was a scrivener's error, or mutual mistake, that entitled the Bank to equitable
relief. The trial court denied the Bank's motion. It concluded as follows:
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The Court is not persuaded by [the argument that the facts establish a
scrivener's error]. Rather, the undisputed facts above clearly demonstrate a
failure to execute the necessary documents to effectuate a transfer from
G&L to Defendant McDonald. Whether the fault for this failure lies with
[the Bank] or the escrow officer who conducted the closing is not an issue
presently before this Court. Irrespective of who caused the oversight, the
fact remains that the failure to execute a document does not amount to a
"scrivener's error." Indeed, this is not a case where the instruments
themselves contain mistakes which were contrary to the parties' intent. All
of the Affidavits referenced above agree that the documents executed were
the documents intended with the only error being that one additional
document was not provided and therefore not executed. The Court is
satisfied that the doctrine of reformation is simply inapplicable under these
circumstances.
R. 1144.
From this language, it appears that the court denied reformation on the grounds
that the failure to execute a deed is not a scrivener's error. As discussed below, this view
is at odds with the authorities.
B.
Reformation Is An Appropriate Remedy for the Failure to Execute A
Document.
Notwithstanding the trial court's holding that the failure to execute a document is
not a scrivener's error, the authorities establish that the failure to execute a document is a
claim for which reformation will lie. In support of this proposition, in its motion to
reconsider the Bank cited Aetna Indemnity v. Baltimore S. P. & C. Ry. Co., 84 A. 166
(Maryland App. 1912), cited in Reformation of Instruments § 50, 76 CJS 462 (2007).
Aetna Indemnity involved reformation of a performance bond given to the
Baltimore, Sparrows Point and Chesapeake Railway Company by Aetna Indemnity. The
bond was given to secure the performance of a construction contract entered by
Construction Engineer's Company and the railway company for the construction of an
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electrical railway. The bond was signed by Aetna and delivered to the contractor. Id. at
168. The contractor did not sign the bond but delivered it to the railway company. Id.
All parties believed that the contractor had signed the bond even though it had not. Id.
The railway company brought suit seeking reformation of the bond and a claim on the
bond, as reformed. Id. at 167-168.
In affirming the trial court's grant of reformation, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland stated:
There can be no possible doubt that all parties to the bond intended and
understood it to be a perfected obligation when it reached the hands of the
Railway Company, and that, upon the faith of this indemnity, the contract
of the principal for the construction of the obligee's railway was allowed to
become effective. These are the precise conditions which this court
described . . . as presenting an appropriate case for the reformation of a
bond even as against a surety
Id. at 168, 171.
It would therefore appear that reformation for the purpose of having a document
executed is an appropriate claim under the doctrine. The Bank respectfully submits that
the trial court erred in holding that the failure of McDonald to timely execute the special
warranty deed is a claim for which relief cannot be granted under the doctrine.
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C. While In The Technical Sense, The Failure To Execute A Deed Might
Not Be a "Scrivener's Error", The Undisputed Facts Establish That The Failure To
Execute and Record the Special Warranty Deed was a Mutual Mistake Not Caused
by Either The Bank or McDonald.
While in the technical sense, the failure to execute and record a deed may not be a
"scrivener's error",10 the undisputed facts of this case establish that the failure to execute
and record the special warranty deed was a mutual mistake not caused by either the Bank
or McDonald, but was rather caused by a third party, the escrow officer. The October 6,
2009 Memorandum Decision acknowledges the fact of this mistake:
. . . the only error being that one additional document was not provided and
therefore not executed."
R. 1144, italics added. Hence, there is no question that the parties intended the deed to be
executed and recorded. And, there is no question that the reason it wasn't was an
oversight by the escrow officer. Nor is there any doubt that the mistake was not on the
part of McDonald or the Bank. As a result, there can be no question that the failure to
have a deed executed and recorded was a mutual mistake.
The Bank respectfully disagrees with the trial court's analysis and submits that the
facts of this case warrant an application of the doctrine of reformation. This is because a
scrivener's error is merely a sub-category of mutual mistake. It is the existence of the
mutual mistake that affords reformation as a remedy. Thus, even though the Bank
believes that the present facts amount to a scrivener's error, even if technically they do
10

But see Gonzales v. Strand Condominium, 17 Misc. 3d 1139(A), 2007 WL 4336411
(N.Y. Supp. 2007, unreported disposition) (Page 7 of a contract was omitted "likely
caused by a clerical error (tantamount to a 'scrivener's error') in photocopying or faxing
the document.").
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not, they still establish mutual mistake, entitling the Bank to reformation. This is because
reformation is predicated on the equitable maxim that equity treats as done that which
ought to be done. Reformation ofInstruments § 2, 76 CJ.S. 420 (2007).
The Bank respectfully submits that based upon this undisputed mistake, it is
entitled to relief.
D.

The Trial Court's Decision Exalts Form Over Substance.

Utah cases clearly demonstrate that reformation is allowed where the error
complained of is incorrect information placed in, or omitted from, a document prepared
by a scrivener. See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark 548 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah 1976). That
case involved the archetypal "scrivener's error" for which relief is readily granted: a
reservation of 75% of the oil, gas, and mineral rights was omitted from a deed.
There is no meaningful distinction between the typical scrivener's error such as
Doxey-Layton Co. in which there is an omission in a deed, and the facts of this case in
which the escrow officer (the scrivener) failed to prepare a deed. In the typical
scrivener's error, the person who prepared the deed failed to place correct information in
the deed. In such a case, the transaction as executed, does not reflect the parties'
agreement. In the present case, the escrow agent simply failed to prepare the deed.
Because the deed was not prepared, the transaction also does not reflect the parties'
agreement.
There is no material difference between an omission of critical information from a
deed so that an intended real property interest is not conveyed and the failure to prepare
and execute a deed intended to convey that same real property interest. In one case, the
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critical words are omitted from a piece of paper. In the other, it is the piece of paper (the
deed) that is omitted. In both circumstances, the parties agreed to convey the interest. In
both circumstances, the interest is not conveyed. And, in both circumstances, the
omission is not the mistake of the parties, but rather is the mistake of a third party with
whom the parties contracted for the preparation of the deed. In one case through error,
the deed is incorrectly prepared. In the other, through error, the deed is not prepared at
all. There is no meaningful distinction between these circumstances.
Stated otherwise, to distinguish the failure to execute a deed conveying property
from the failure to include within a deed language necessary for such a conveyance, is to
exalt form over substance. Such a result is at variance with principles of equity, where
the controlling consideration is the substance and not the form of the transaction. See,
e.g., Macay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995) ("Equity regards the substance
rather than the form of a transaction

") (citing Powell v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1131

(Utah 1975) (Maughan, J., dissenting)).
E.
The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Doctrine of Reformation Is
Unduly Restrictive.
The undisputed facts of this case establish that in June 2006 McDonald, as
president of G&L Mac, Inc., did not execute a deed to McDonald individually as the
parties intended. Rather, six months after the closing, the mistake was discovered and at
that time a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. to McDonald individually was executed and
recorded. Hence, the mistake in this case is that rather than being signed and recorded in
June of 2006, the deed vesting title in McDonald was signed and recorded in December
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2006. The relief the Bank has requested is reformation of the special warranty deed to be
effective June 2,2006, the date the parties intended the Bank's deed of trust to attach to
the Property. While these circumstances are not the typical reformation circumstance, the
authorities are clear that reformation is available under these facts.
In Atwood v. Mikeska, 115 P. 1011 (Okla. 1911), the parties entered into a written
contract wherein the vendor agreed to deliver "a good and sufficient warranty deed" to
certain real property. The written contract also failed to include certain terms upon which
the parties had agreed. The vendor refused to deliver the deed. The purchaser sued
seeking reformation of the written contract and specific performance of the contract as
reformed for the delivery of the deed. While the case at bar does not involve a claim of
specific performance because McDonald eventually did execute and deliver the special
warranty deed, the language of the Oklahoma court is instructive.
When, through mistake or accident, from an executory contract or
instrument for the sale of real estate there has been omitted matter intended
to have been included, it may be reformed, and its specific performance
decreed.
Atwood, 115 P. at 1011-1012.
In Gonzales v. Strand Condominium, 17 Misc. 3d 1139(A), 2007 WL 4336411
(N. Y. Supp. 2007, unreported disposition), a case similar to this case, the court allowed
reformation where page 7 of a contract wras omitted where the omission was "likely
caused by a clerical error (tantamount to a 'scrivener's error') in photocopying or faxing
the document."
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In Ocwen v. Gilmore, 284 B.R. 801 (Bky. Va. 2002), a wife did not sign a deed of
trust upon property owned by the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. The facts
established that the husband and wife knew and intended that the loan was to be secured
by their property and that the lender intended to take a security interest therein. The
lender sought to have the deed of trust reformed to add the wife's name to the deed of
trust and to declare the reformation retroactive to the time of execution. The court
reformed the deed of trust retroactive to the settlement date adding the wife as a grantor.
284 B.R. at 805.
In this case, the Bank is not asking the Court to reform the deed of trust to add the
signature of G&L Mac, Inc. This is not necessary because G&L Mac, Inc. executed the
special warranty deed when requested. Rather, the only relief the Bank is asking is to
reform the special warranty deed to be effective June 2, 2006, as the parties to the
agreement intended. Such relief is clearly appropriate under the facts of this case and
well within the doctrine.
F. The Relief Requested Is Consistent With Utah Law Because When
Reformed, The Special Warranty Deed "Relates Back" and Vests Title to the
Property in Gary McDonald Individually, as the Parties Originally Intended,
Resulting In The Bank's Deed of Trust Having Priority Over Taylor's Deed of
Trust.
Utah law is clear that reformation operates retroactively. Katzenberger v. State,
735 P.2d 405, 408 fn. 1 (Utah App. 1987)("The general rule is that reformation of a deed
relates back to, and takes effect from, the date of conveyance and is binding on all except
bona fide purchasers without notice and those standing in similar relations. L.E. Myers
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Co. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 61 111. App.3d 496, 24 111. Dec. 182, 384 N.E.2d 1340
(1978) and cases cited therein.").
Hence, the relief requested is fully consistent with Utah law.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the relative priority of two deeds of trust is at issue. Taylor has
appealed the trial court's decision granting the Bank summary judgment based upon
Utah's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice statutes. This Court should affirm the trial
court's ruling on those issues because the trial court correctly applied the statutes to the
Bank's deed of trust and the special warranty deed. In so doing, the court ruled that the
Bank's deed of trust was as effective "as i f title to the Property had been in its borrower
at the time of the Bank's deed of trust. This holding is correct under either U.C.A. § 571-10 or U.C.A.§ 57-1-20.
None of the arguments that Taylor presents on appeal are persuasive. In
particular, Taylor's arguments require this Court to ignore material provisions of the
relevant statutes, assume facts that are contrary to those in the record, and apply a chain
of title analysis to Utah's recording and tract index statutes. Finally, Taylor's arguments
are not persuasive because he was on notice of the Bank's interest and had "read' and
"approved" provisions of his promissory notes that provided that the Bank would receive
the first disbursements from the sale of the subdivision lots.
As an alternative position, the Bank has cross-appealed the trial court's denial of
its reformation claim. While the Bank believes that the escrow officer's mistake was a
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scrivener's error, which allows for the relief the Bank requests, even if it is not, the error
of the escrow officer was still a mutual mistake for which a claim of reformation will lie.
For the reasons stated above, the Bank requests this Court to affirm the trial
court's ruling on the Bank's After-Acquired Title and Race-Notice theories and reverse
the trial court and direct that summary judgment be entered in favor of the Bank on its
reformation claim.
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